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THE DEFINITIONAL SCOPE OF AN 

INTRINSIC UTILITARIAN FUNCTION 

UNDER THE 1976 COPYRIGHT ACT: 







Under the 1976 Copyright Act ("1976 Act"),l "pictorial, 
graphic, [or] sculptural works"2 are proper subject matter warrant­
ing copyright protection.3 The designs of useful articles,4 however, 
are not copyrightable.s The exception to this exception, otherwise 
known as the question of separability,6 is that useful articles enjoy 
* At the time of publication, this article was being considered in the Nathan 
Burkan Memorial Writing Competition. 
1. 17 V.S.c. §§ 101-1101 (1996). 
2. Id. § 101. 

"Pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works" include two-dimensional and three­

dimensional works of fine, graphic, and applied art, photographs, prints and 

art reproductions, maps, globes, charts, diagrams, models, and technical draw­
ings, including architectural plans. Such works shall include works of artistic 
craftsmanship insofar as their form but not their mechanical or utilitarian as­
pects are concerned . . . . 
Id. 
3. See id. § 102(a)(5). 
4. See id. § 101 ("A 'useful article' is an article having an intrinsic utilitarian func­
tion that is not merely to portray the appearance of the article or to convey information. 
An article that is normally a part of a useful article is considered a 'useful article.' "). 
5. See id. 
[T]he design of a useful article, as defined in this section, shall be considered a 
pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work only if, and only to the extent that, such 
design incorporates pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features that can be identi­
fied separately from, and are capable of existing independently of, the utilita­
rian aspects of the article. 
Id.; see also OddzOn Prod., Inc. v. Oman, 924 F.2d 346, 349 (D.C. Cir. 1991) ("Congress 
excluded the design of useful articles from the realm of copyright ...."). 
6. For an examination on the issue of separability, see Raymond M. Polakovic, 
Comment, Should the Bauhaus Be in the Copyright Doghouse? Rethinking Conceptual 
Separability, 64 V. COLO. L. REv. 871 (1993). See also Ralph S. Brown, Design Protec­
tion: An Overview, 34 VCLA L. REv. 1341 (1987); Robert C. Denicola, Applied Art 
and Industrial Design: A Suggested Approach to Copyright in Useful Articles, 67 MINN. 
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copyright protection to the extent that pictorial, graphic, or sculp­
tural features can exist independently of, and separately from the 
utilitarian aspects of the article.7 
Consequently, if an article seeking copyright protection is de­
fined as a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work, the article is copy­
rightable except for its mechanical or utilitarian aspects.8 If an 
article is defined as a useful article, then its design is not copyright­
able except to the extent that copyrightable pictorial, graphic, or 
sculptural features can be identified and are capable of existing in­
dependently of and separately from the article.9 The question pre­
ceding any discussion concerning the copyright ability of an article is 
determining whether the article seeking protection is properly de­
fined as a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work or as a useful article. 
This question was recently addressed by the Fourth Circuit in 
Superior Form Builders, Inc. v. Dan Chase Taxidermy Supply Co., 
Inc. 10 In that case, the court was faced with the question of 
"whether animal mannequins used by taxidermists to mount animal 
skins [were] copyrightable."ll Before deciding the issue of 
copyrightability, however, the court had to determine whether the 
mannequins were "useful articles" or "sculptural works" as defined 
by the 1976 Act.12 The court found that the principal utilitarian 
aspect of the animal mannequins was their portrayal of animal ex­
pressions.13 The animal mounts were properly defined as sculptural 
works, and the court held that the artistic "portrayal of the animal's 
body expression" was copyrightable.14 
Distinguishing pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works from use­
ful articles must be based on the purposes of copyright law. The 
ultimate goal of copyright law is to foster the creation and dissemi­
nation of intellectual works and to promote the growth of learning 
and culture for the public welfare.15 "The Constitution, [under art. 
L. REv. 707 (1983); Rebecca Ishaq Foster, Comment, Protect the Bastard Child of the 
Arts: Copyright Protection for Theatrical Costumes, 22 Sw. U. L. REV. 431 (1993); Gary 
S. Raskin, Comment, Copyright Protection for Useful Articles: Can the Design of an 
Object Be Conceptually Separated from the Object's Function?, 33 SANTA CLARA L. 
REv. 171 (1993). 
7. See 17 U.S.c. § 101. See supra note 4 for the definition of useful articles. 
8. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102(a)(5). 
9. See id. § 101. 
10. 74 F.3d 488 (4th Cir. 1996). 
11. [d. at 491. 
12. [d. 
13. See id. at 494. 
14. Id. 
15. See, e.g., Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., Inc., 471 U.S. 539, 
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I, § 8, cl. 8], does not establish copyrights, but provides that Con­
gress shall have the power to grant such rights if it thinks best. Not 
primarily for the benefit of the author, but primarily for the benefit 
of the public, such rights are given. "16 By securing "the award[s] 
due them for their contribution[s] to society," granting authors ex­
clusive rights in their works for a limited time is a means to promot­
ing the growth of learning and culture for the public welfare 
because "copyright stimulates their creation and dissemination of 
intellectual workS."17 
Courts are in the unenviable position of striking a balance be­
tween protecting the works of authors and promoting the public 
interest.18 Some commentators note that if a balance cannot be 
struck between protecting original expression and promoting public 
progress, then it is wiser to err in favor of over-protection.19 Unfor­
tunately, broadening the scope of protection when unnecessary un­
dermines the goals of copyright because it comes at the expense of 
public learning and welfare.2o 
This paper addresses the issue of how courts should determine 
the appropriate analytical starting point before defining the scope 
of copyright protection afforded any particular article. Under a 
"primary functional significance" analysis, the utilitarian functions 
of an article seeking copyright protection are weighed against its 
aesthetic functions. If aesthetic qualities are found to be primary, 
then the article is properly defined as a pictorial, graphic, or sculp­
tural work. Conversely, if utilitarian functions are primarily signifi­
cant, then the article is properly defined as a useful article subject 
to the question of separability. 
Apportioning the relative weight of aesthetic functionality and 
utilitarian functionality necessarily occurs on an ad hoc basis. How­
ever, the purpose of copyright is to promote the arts and sciences 
546 (1985); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,450 (1984); 
REpORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. 
COPYRIGlIT LAW 3-6 (1961) [hereinafter REpORT ON THE GENERAL REVISION]. 
16. H.R. No. 2222, 60th Congo (1908). 
17. REpORT ON THE GENERAL REVISION, supra note 15, at 3-6. 
18. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (the purpose of copyright law is "[t]o promote 
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and 
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries"). 
19. See, e.g., Raskin, supra note 6, at 209-10. 
20. See, e.g., REpORT ON THE GENERAL REVISION, supra note 15, at 3-6 (the sec­
ondary purpose to fostering and creating intellectual works for public welfare is re­
warding authors for their works; however, "the interests of authors must yield to [] 
public welfare where [these interests] conflict"). 
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for public welfare. Thus, the appropriate scope of copyright should 
be determined based on the specific article seeking protection and 
not on a general categorization of the article.z1 Whether particular 
articles possess an intrinsic 'utilitarian function beyond portraying 
appearance or conveying information is a question of fact. Rather 
than favoring over-protection and holding that certain articles do 
not possess an intrinsic utilitarian function beyond portraying ap­
pearance or conveying information a~ a matter of law,2z a case-by­
case analysis to determine "usefulness" protects the interests of au­
thors, the public welfare, and establishes clearer guidelines to ad­
dress future issues of this nature. 
I. BACKGROUND 
Useful articles are articles having an intrinsic utilitarian func­
tion beyond portraying their oWn appearance or conveying infor­
mation.z3 They need not be complex or highly technical devices 
like cars or computers. Useful articles "can be as mundane a tech­
nology as a hand-cranked pencil sharpener. "Z4 SO long as articles 
retain "an intrinsic utilitarian function,"z5 they are defined as useful 
and their designs are not copyrightable unless particular elements 
of their designs satisfy the separability test. The purpose. of this 
paper is to explore the various interpretations of "intrinsic utilita­
rian function" and to examine the metes and bounds defining the 
judicial scope of what constitute useful articles.z6 This paper ana­
lyzes existing statutory language and judicial interpretations of that 
language, and asserts that the appropriate starting point in defining 
the proper scope of copyright. protection is determined under a 
"primary functional significance" -analysis. Accorc;iingly, a brIef re­
view of the development of copyright protection afforded useful ar­
ticles is necessary in order to determine the proper definitional 
scope of intrinsic utilitarian functions. 
21. See, e.g., Note, Protection for the Artistic Aspects of Articles of Utility, 72 
HARV. L. REV. 1520, 1525-26 (1959); cf Gay Toys, Inc. v. Buddy L Corp., 703 F.2d 970 
(6th Cir. 1983). 
22. See, e.g., Gay Toys, 703 F.2d at 972-73. 
23. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1996) ("A 'useful article' is an article having an intrinsic 
utilitarian function that is not merely to portray the appearance of the article or to 
convey information."). 
24. Polakovic, supra note 6, at 872 (citing Ted Arnold, Ltd. v. Silvercraft Co., 259 
F. Supp. 733 (S.D.N.Y. 1966)). 
25. 17 U.S.c. § 101 (emphasis added). 
26. See infra Part I.B.2. 
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A. 	 The Development of Copyright Protection Concerning Useful 
Articles 
In 1903, the Supreme Court decided' Bleistein v. Donaldson 
Lithographing CO.27 In Bleistein, the Court was faced with the 
question of whether artistic works are copyrightable when their 
principal functions "are among the useful arts."28 At issue was a 
painted circus advertisement the defendant had copied.29 The 
plaintiff sued for infringement.3o The defendant argued that adver­
tisements were not proper subject matter warranting copyright pro­
tection.31 The Court held that the advertisement's utilitarian 
function, i.e., promoting the circus "to increase trade and to help 
make money," did not bar copyright protection.32 Under Bleistein, 
articles serving principally utilitarian functions such as advertise­
ments may be proper subject matter for copyright protection. Un­
fortunately, the Court did not define the extent or scope of such 
protection. Consequently, the answer to this question is answered 
by examining the evolution of protection for useful articles follow­
ing Bleistein. 
1. Examining Protection Prior to the 1976 Act 
The Copyright Act of 1909 ("1909 Act")33 was enacted shortly 
after Bleistein. The 1909 Act provided copyright protection to 
"[w]orks of art."34 In implementing the 1909 Act, however, the 
Copyright Office35 could not determine whether protection was 
27. .188 U.S. 239 (1903). See also Raskin, supra note 6, at 174, for a further dis­
cussion of Bleistein. 
28. Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 249. 
29. See id. at 242. 
30. See id. at 240. 
31. See id. 
32. [d. at 251. 
33. 17 U.S.c. §§ 1-216 (1909), amended by 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1978) (current 
version at 17 U.S.c. §§ 101-1101 (1996)). See also Raskin, supra note 6, at 174, for a 
further discussion of the 1909 Act. 
34. 17 U.S.c. § 5(g) (1909), amended by 17 U.S.c. §§ 101-810 (1978) (current ver­
sion at 17 U.S.c. §§ 101-1101 (1996)); see also Denicola, supra note 6, at 710. 
Among the items eligible for copyright under the 1909 Act were those speci­
fied in section 5(g) .... With the deletion of all reference to the "fine arts," a 
major barrier to copyright in the design of useful objects apparently fell. No 
logic could demonstrate that crystal wine glasses, pearl rings, or even hand­
some radio cabinets were not "works of art." 
[d. (footnotes omitted). 
35. Under the direction of the Register of Copyrights, the Copyright Office is 
charged with all administrative functions and duties under the 1976 Copyright Act. See 
17 U.S.c. § 701 (1996). The Register of Copyrights is responsible for establishing and 
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properly available to applied works of art, i.e., useful articles, or 
only to works of fine art. The Copyright Office was accepting utili­
tarian objects for copyright registration while adopting regulations 
rejecting such registrations.36 Ultimately, however, the Copyright 
Office promulgated regulation 202.8 in 1948 which defined works of 
art to include "'works of artistic craftsmanship, insofar as their 
form but not their mechanical or utilitarian aspects are con­
cerned.'''37 Hence, under regulation 202.8, the designs of useful 
works of art were proper subject matter warranting copyright 
protection.38 
In Mazer v. Stein,39 the Supreme Court endorsed regula­
tion 202.8 and held that aesthetic and artistic elements subsisting in 
useful articles are copyrightable. At issue in Mazer were identical 
copies of lamp bases sculpted in the form of Balinese Dancers.40 
The respondents had registered the lamp bases for copyright as 
"works of art"41 under the 1909 Act separately from the mechanical 
parts of the lamp.42 Ignoring the functional aspect of their intended 
use as lamp bases, the Court held that original works of art do not 
cease to be copyrightable as works of art when they are incorpo­
rated into the designs of useful articles.43 The lamp bases were de­
serving of copyright protection because they represented a form of 
promulgating regulations to administer the Copyright Act. See id. § 702. See also Ras­
kin, supra note 6, at 174-75 for a further discussion of the Copyright Office's promul­
gated regulations. 
36. "In a 1910 regulation defining 'works of art,' the Copyright Office restricted 
the newly established classification to 'the so-called fine arts,' expressly excluding 
'[p]roductions of the industrial arts utilitarian in purpose and character.'" Denicola, 
supra note 6, at 710 (quoting COPYRIGHT OFFICE, RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR THE 
REGISTRATION OF CLAIMS TO COPYRIGHT, BULL. No. 15, § 12(g) (1910». However, 
the Copyright Office amended this regulation in 1917 to allow registration of "artistic 
drawings notwithstanding they may afterwards be utilized for articles of manufacture." 
37 C.F.R. § 201.4(7) (1917); see also Raskin, supra note 6, at 175; Shira Perlmutter, 
Conceptual Separability and Copyright in the Designs of Useful Articles, 37 J. COpy­
RIGHT SOC'Y 339, 342-43 (1990). 
37. Raskin, supra note 6, at 175 (quoting 37 C.F.R. § 202.8 (1949». 
38. The 1976 Act, contrary to the 1909 Act, does not refer to "works of art" as 
proper subject matter warranting copyright protection. This classification was aban­
doned in favor of a new category referring to "pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works." 
17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(5) (1996). 
39. 347 U.S. 201 (1954). See also Raskin, supra note 6, at 175-76 for a further 
discussion of Mazer. 
40. See Mazer, 347 U.S. at 202. 
41. Note that the 1976 Act abandoned the term "works of art" in favor of "picto­
rial, graphic, and sculptural works." 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(5). 
42. See Mazer, 347 U.S. at 202. 
43. See id. at 218. 
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artistic craftsmanship and were not part of the mechanical or utilita­
rian aspects of the lamp.44 The Court concluded that there was 
"nothing in the copyright statute to support the argument that the 
intended use or use in industry of an article eligible for copyright 
bars or invalidates its registration. "45 
Responding to the Court's decision in Mazer, the Copyright 
Office promulgated regulation 202.10.46 This regulation embodied 
the principle, affirmed in Mazer, that commercial use does not dis­
qualify an otherwise registrable work of art from copyright protec­
tion.47 However, in attempting to define the eligibility of artistically 
shaped utilitarian articles for copyright protection, regulation 
202.1O(c) stated that if "the sole intrinsic function of an article is its 
utility, the fact that it is unique and attractively shaped will not 
qualify it as a [protect able] work of art."48 The Copyright Office 
amended this regulation three years later by granting protection to 
those artistic features of useful articles that "can be identified sepa­
rately and are capable of existing independently as" works of art.49 
"It was this amended version of the regulation which made separa­
bility a crucial element in determining which aspects of, and to what 
extent useful articles are protected."50 In sum, regulation 202.10 
denied copyright protection to useful articles incorporating aes­
thetically pleasing designs incapable of existing independently as 
protectable works of art under the 1909 Act. 
Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer51 is a good example of regulation 
202.10's application. The question on appeal was whether the over­
all shape of a utilitarian object is an article eligible for copyright.52 
In Esquire, the manufacturer of outdoor lighting fixtures sought 
copyright protection for the overall shape of its fixtures as a "work 
44. See id.; cf. 37 C.F.R. § 202.8 (1949). 
45. Mazer, 347 U.S. at 218. 
46. See 37 C.F.R. § 202.10 (1957). See also Raskin, supra note 6, at 176, for a 
further discussion of section 202.10. 
47. See 37 C.F.R. § 202.10(b) ("The registrability of a work of art is not affected 
by the intention of the author as to the use of the work."). 
48. 37 C.F.R. § 202.1O(c) (amended 1960). 
49. 37 C.F.R. § 202.1O(c) (1960). 
50. Raskin, supra note 6, at 176 (footnote omitted). See also supra note 6 for a 
list of authorities discussing and examining the difficulties associated with applying the 
separability test to useful articles. 
51. 414 F. Supp. 939 (D.D.C. 1976), rev'd, 591 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir. 1978). For an 
in-depth discussion of Esquire, see Aleksandra A. Miziolek, Casenote, Copyright 
Law-Copyright Protection for Industrial Designs Under the 1976 Copyright Acts, 25 
WAYNE L. REV. 923 (1979). 
52. See Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer, 591 F.2d 796, 798, 804 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
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of art" under the 1909 Act.53 Although the case was decided in 
1978, the articles in question were subject to the 1909 Act and ac­
companying regulations because the 1976 Act was not effective un­
til January 1, 1978.54 . 
The Register of Copyrights refused Esquire's application for 
copyright protection. 55 The Register cited regulation 202.10(c) as 
precluding registration of the designs of utilitarian articles, such as 
lighting fixtures, "when all of the design· elements ... are directly 
related to the useful functions of the article."56 According to the 
Register, the lighting fixtures or their overall shape did not contain 
"'elements, either alone or in combination, which are capable of 
independent existence as a copyrightable'" work of art under the 
1909 Act.57 
Esquire argued that it designed its lighting fixtures with the in­
tent of creating modern art.58 Under regulation 202.10, Esquire 
maintained, "that as long as the overall shape of a utilitarian article 
embodies dual intrinsic functions-aesthetic and utilitarian-that 
shape may qualify for registration. "59 Hence, Esquire contended 
that the sole intrinsic function of its lighting fixtures was not utility; 
rather, they also possessed aesthetic functions properly warranting 
copyright protection.60 The district court agreed with Esquire and 
found that the lighting fixture's "sole intrinsic function" was not 
utility in that the fixtures served "both to decorate and illumi­
nate. "61 The court held that the lighting fixtures were proper sub­
ject matter warranting copyright protection.62 However, after 
acknowledging that the 1976 Act was not applicable to the instant 
question, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Co­
lumbia Circuit reversed the lower court's decision and denied copy­
right registration based on an examination of the Act's statutory 
language and legislative history.63 
53. See id. at 798-99. 
54. See id. at 799 n.8; Raskin, supra note 6, at 177. 
55. See Esquire, 591 F.2d at 798 .. 
56. Id. (quoting 37 C.F.R. § 202.10(c) (1976». "Form follows function, in the 
credo of one school of art." Id. at 807 (Leventhal, J.,. concurring). 
57. Id. at 798 (footnote omitted). 
58. See id. at 800. 
59. Id. at 804. 
60. See id. at 800, 804. 
61. Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer, 414 F. Supp. 939, 941 (D.D.C. 1976), rev'd, 591 F.2d 
796 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
62. See id. 
63. See Esquire, 591 F.2d at 799 n.8, 802-05. 
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2. Examining Protection After the 1976 Act 
Whereas regulation 202.10(c) defined articles as useful if their 
"sole intrinsic function" was their utility, the 1976 Copyright Act 
denies copyright protection to articles "even if [their] sole intrinsic 
function is not utility."64 Under the 1976 Act, articles are defined 
as useful if such articles possess "an intrinsic utilitarian function."65 
Hence, "articles which are functional only in their appearance have 
an intrinsic aesthetic function [and are copyrightable], whereas ob­
jects which have a use beyond mere appearance have an intrinsic 
utilitarian function [and are not copyrightable]."66 
The 1976 Act broadly defines an article as "useful" and not 
subject to copyright protection if it possesses any intrinsic use or 
function beyond merely portraying the appearance of the article or 
conveying information. Courts have generally interpreted any use 
beyond portraying appearance or conveying information under the 
1976 Act as an intrinsic utilitarian function.67 Under these interpre­
tations, for example, Esquire could not have argued that its lighting 
fixtures were copyrightable sculptural works because they pos­
sessed an additional use, i.e., to illuminate, beyond merely portray­
ing appearance or conveying information. This additional use 
would have qualified the lighting fixtures as useful articles under 
the 1976 Act. 
64. Mark A. LoBello, The Dichotomy Between Anistic Expression and Industrial 
Design: To Protect or Not to Protect, 13 WHITTIER L: REv. 107, 127 (1992). 
65. 17 U.S.c. § 101 (1996) (emphasis added) ("A 'useful article' is an article hav­
ing an intrinsic utilitarian function that is not merely to portray the iiPpearance of the 
article or to convey information."). 
66. Raskin, supra note 6, at 208. Courts have generally interpreted any use be­
yond portraying appearance as an intrinsic 'utilitarian function. See, e.g., Mazer v. Stein, 
347 U.S. 201 (1954); Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903); 
Masquerade Novelty, Inc. v. Unique Indus., 912 F.2d 663 (3d Cir. 1990); Whimsicality, 
Inc. v. Rubie's COstume Co., 891 F.2d 452 (2d Cir. 1989); Brandir Int'!, Inc. v. Cascade 
Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142 (2d Cir. 1987); Carol Barnhart Inc. v. Economy Cover 
Corp., 773 F.2d 411 (2d Cir. 1985); Poe v. Missing Persons, 745 F.2d 1238 (9th Cir. 
1984); Fabrica Inc. v. El Dorado Corp., 697 F.2d 890 (9th Cir. 1983); Norris Indus. v. 
International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 696 F.2d 918 (11th Cir. 1983); Kieselstein-Cord v. Ac­
cessories by Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989 (2d Cir. 1980); Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer, 591 F.2d 
796 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Gay Toys, Inc. v. Buddy L Corp., 522 F. Supp. 622 (E.D. Mich. 
1981), rev'd, 703 F.2d 970 (6th Cir. 1983); Ted Arnold Ltd. v. Silvercraft Co., 259 F. 
Supp. 733 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). 
Recently, however, some courts have recognized that simply because certain arti­
cles possess utilitarian functions does not mean such functions are intiinsic to those 
articles. See, e.g., Poe, 745 F.2d at 1241-42; Gay Toys, 703 F.2d at 973-74. 
67. See supra note 66 and cases cited therein. 
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Considering the legislative history of the 1976 Act, the court in 
Esquire observed that 
[i]n deleting the modifier "sole" from the language taken from 
§ 202.10(c), the draftsmen of the 1976 Act must have concluded 
that the definition of "useful article" would be more precise with­
out this term. Moreover, Congress may have concluded that lit­
eral application of the phrase "sole intrinsic function" would 
create an unworkable standard. For as one commentator has ob­
served, "[t]here are no two-dimensional works and few three-di­
mensional objects whose design is absolutely dictated by 
utilitarian considerations. "68 
The principal provisions of regulation 202.10(c) are retained in 
present statutory language.69 Eligible articles warranting copyright 
protection under the 1909 Act were defined as "works of art."70 
The 1976 Act replaced this term with a more precise definition of 
68. Esquire, 591 F.2d at 804 (quoting Comment, Copyright Protection for Mass­
Produced, Commercial Products: A Review of the Developments Following Mazer v. 
Stein, 38 U. Du. L. REv. 807, 812 (1971». 
The 1976 Act defines pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features as "works of fine, 
graphic, and applied art, photographs, prints and art reproductions, maps, globes, 
charts, diagrams, models, and technical drawings, including architectural plans. Such 
works shall include works of artistic craftsmanship insofar as their form but not their 
mechanical or utilitarian aspects are concerned ...." 17 U.S.c. § 101. 
The inspiration for this definition stems from Copyright Office Regulation 
202.10(c) under the 1909 Act. See supra notes 46-65 for a discussion of 37 C.F.R. 
§ 202.10(c) (1957). Section 101 and § 202.1O(c) are virtually identical. 
The only difference is that the 1909 Regulation would have denied copyright 
to an attractive article only if "the sole intrinsic function" of the article is util­
ity. The 1976 Act, however, would deny copyright to the shape of a utilitarian 
article even if its sole intrinsic function is not utility. Thus, "a work is a 'useful 
article' and therefore denied copyright for its shape as such, if it has 'an intrin­
sic utilitarian function.''' ... The narrow avenue of potential protection under 
the [1976 Act] is based on the nature of the design. Even if the article has 
aesthetic features, the separability test will provide protection only to those 
aspects that can actually be identified independent of any functional 
considerations. 
LoBello, supra note 64, at 127 (quoting 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COpy· 
RIGHT § 2.08[B] (1988». Unfortunately, the legislative history of the 1976 Act does not 
account for this statutory change between "the sole intrinsic function" of an article and 
"an intrinsic function." It is unclear whether Congress intended to narrow the scope of 
protection afforded useful articles or whether this change in language was merely an 
oversight in drafting § 101. 
69. See 17 U.S.c. §§ 101-810 (1994); Miziolek, supra note 51, at 926 n.28 ("Regu­
lations 202.10(c) and 202.10(a) were both impliedly repealed by the 1976 Copyright 
Act") (citing 17 U.S.c. §§ 101-810 (1976». 
70. See Copyright Act of 1909, 17 U.S.C. §§ 1-216, amended by 17 U.S.c. §§ 101­
810 (1978) (current version at 17 U.S.c. §§ 101-1101 (1994». 
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"pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works."71 This new definition in­
cludes useful articles only to the extent that they embody features 
qualifying as pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works that are capable 
of existing independently of, and separately from the article.72 
In short, the extent to which articles serving utilitarian func­
tions may properly receive copyright protection under the 1976 Act 
depends on whether such articles are defined as useful. The designs 
of useful articles are copyrightable insofar as pictorial, graphic, or 
scuipturaF3 features "can be identified separately ... and are capa­
ble of existing independently" of the utilitarian aspects of such arti­
cles.74 Accordingly, the development and evolution of what 
constitutes an intrinsic utilitarian function must be considered in or­
der to determine a definition for useful articles. 
B. How Intrinsic Utilitarian Functions Are Defined 
The 1976 Act fails to articulate clearly whether and when utili­
tarian functions serve as intrinsic utilitarian functions of useful arti­
cles. The Act does not define what may constitute "intrinsic 
utilitarian functions." It is necessary, then, to examine the legisla­
tive history of the 1976 Act for additional explanation and further 
guidance. 
1. Legislative History 
The 1976 House Report ("Report") observes that the 
copyright ability of pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works does not 
mean that protection stems from "artistic taste, aesthetic value, or 
intrinsic quality."75 Much of the Report's introduction reviews the 
historical development of protection for useful articles.76 Starting 
with Mazer, the Report acknowledges "that protection subsists de­
71. 17 U.S.c. § 101 (1994). 
72. See id. 
73. Note that under the 1909 Act the term used to define copyrightable articles 
was "works of art." See supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text. 
74. 17 U.S.c. § 101. 
75. H.R. REp. No. 94-1476, at 54 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 
5667. Copyright protection does not depend on an article's artistic value. In his famous 
copyright caveat, Justice Holmes warned that "[i]t would be a dangerous undertaking 
for persons trained only in the law to constitute themselves final judges of the worth of 
pictorial illustrations, outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits." Bleistein v. 
Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903). See also Raskin, supra note 6, 
at 178-80 for a further discussion on the legislative reports of the 1976 Copyright Act. 
76. See H.R. REp. No. 94-1476, at 47-50, 53, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 
5660-63,5666-67. See also supra Part I.A for a discussion on the development of copy­
right protection concerning useful articles. 
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spite factors such as mass production, commercial exploitation, and 
the potential availability of design patent protection."77 Purporting 
to draw "as clear a line as possible between copyrightable works of 
applied art and uncopyrighted works of industrial design," the Re­
port states that Congressional intent is not to afford copyright pro­
tection to the shapes of industrial articles even though they may be 
aesthetically pleasing.78 Hence, 
although the shape of an industrial product may be aesthetically 
satisfying and valuable, [Congress'] intention is not to offer it 
copyright protection under the bill. Unless the shape of an auto­
mobile, airplane, ladies' dress, food processor, television set, or 
any other industrial product contains some element that, physi­
cally or conceptually, can be identified as separable from the util­
itarian aspects of that article, the design would not be 
copyrighted under the hill. The test of separability and indepen­
dence from "the utilitarian aspects of the article" does not de­
pend upon the nature of the design-that is, even if the 
appearance of an article is determined by esthetic (as opposed to 
functional) considerations, only elements, if any, which can be 
identified separately from the useful article as such are 
copyrightable.79 
The above language does not establish any guidelines to deter­
mine whether something qualifies as a useful article. The Report 
merely reiterates a familiar definition, in that, useful articles are ar­
ticles having an intrinsic utilitarian function that does more than 
simply port!ay appearance or convey information.8o Though the 
Report cites examples of "utilitarian articles such as textile fabrics, 
wallpaper, containers, and the like," e.g., automobiles, planes, and 
industrial products,81 nowhere does the Report specify what consti­
tutes an intrinsic utilitarian function. 
Unfortunately, the line between copyrightable pictorial, 
graphic, or sculptural works and uncopyrightable industrial designs 
is not so clear as to permit an immediate understanding of when 
articles seeking copyright protection are considered useful for copy­
right purposes. The task of ascertaining this distinction falls to the 
77. Raskin, supra note 6, at 178 (citing H.R. REp. No. 94-1476, at 54, reprinted in 
1976 U.S.CC.A.N. at 5667-68). 
78. H.R. REp. No. 94-1476, at 55, reprinted in 1976 U.S.CC.A.N. at 5668-69; see 
also LoBello, supra note 64, at 115. 
79. H.R. REp. No. 94-1476, at 55, reprinted in 1976 U.S.CCA.N. at 5668-69. 
80. See id. at 54, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5667-68. 
81. Id. at 55, reprinted in 1976 U.S.CCA.N. at 5667-68. 
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judiciary. Accordingly, judicial interpretations of intrinsic utilita­
rian functions must be considered in order to determine what 
makes up a useful article subject to the separability test. 
2. Judicial Interpretations 
Neither the 1976 Act nor its legislative history provide any in­
structions to determine whether utilitarian functions are intrinsic to 
particular articles. "Since useful articles are defined as articles 
which have an 'intrinsic utilitarian function,' the scope of this defi­
nition lies in the interpretation' of what is meant by. 'intrinsic."'82 
Generally, courts have considered uses,83 i.e., functions, beyond 
portraying appearance or conveying information as intrinsic utilita­
rian functions under the 1976 Act. 
The first court to examine the language of the 1976 House Re­
port was the Second Circuit in Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by 
Pearl, Inc. 84 At issue in Kieselstein were designer belt buckles. In 
his majority opinion, Judge Oakes noted that "these [were] not or­
dinary buckles; they [were] sculptured designs cast in precious met­
als-decorative in nature and used as jewelry is ... , principally for 
ornamentation."85 The designer of the, belt buckles successfully 
registered his belt buckles with the Copyright Office as original 
sculptures and designs.86 The defendant admitted to copying the 
designs but asserted that the buckles qualified as "useful articles" 
under the 1976 Act and were not entitled to copyright protection 
because no "'pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features [I;ould be] 
identified separately,'" whether physically or conceptually, from the 
'''utilitarian aspects' of the buckles."87 
Agreeing with the defendant that the belt buckles were useful 
articles, Judge Oakes, however, found protectable design elements 
conceptually separable from the utilitarian aspects of the buckles.88 
Unfortunately, Judge Oakes did not discuss any pertinent utilitarian 
aspects of the buckles or what intrinsic utilitarian functions sub­
sisted in the buckles to qualifY them as useful. art.icles subject to the 
separability test. Indeed, the only reference to utility is Judge 
82. Raskin, supra note 6, at 208 (citation omitted). 
83. "Use" is defined as "a particular service or end," for example, "purpose, ob­
ject, [or] function." WEBsrnR's TmRD NEW INT'L DICm)NARY 2523 (1976). 
84. 632 F.2d 989 (2d Cir. 1980). 
85. Id. at 990. 
86. See id. at 990-91. 
87. Id. at 991-92. 
88. See id. at 993. 
156 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20:143 
Oakes' observation that "[t]he primary ornamental aspect of the 
[belt] buckles is conceptually separable from their subsidiary utilita­
rian function."89 Judge Oakes never stated what constituted this 
"subsidiary utilitarian function." 
Judge Weinstein did not forget the significance of considering 
the utilitarian functions of the buckles in his dissent. "The works 
sued on are . . . indubitably belt buckles and nothing else; their 
innovations of form are inseparable from the important function 
they serve-helping to keep the tops of trousers at waist level. "90 
Though his discussion focused on the issue of conceptual separabil­
ity, Judge Weinstein cited other examples of what qualified as use­
ful articles, including telephones, "piggy-banks," scarves, 
dinnerware, lighting fixtures, shoes, watchfaces, socks, and 
clothes.91 Yet, neither Judge Oakes' majority opinion nor Judge 
Weinstein's dissenting opinion offer any insight as to what utilita­
rian functions are considered intrinsic to the above articles. As a 
result, Kieselstein accepts without argument that utilitarian func­
tions beyond aesthetic functions are intrinsic to the articles in ques­
tion, e.g., that an intrinsic utilitarian function of belt buckles is 
keeping pants from falling below waistlines. 
Subsequent to Kieselstein, the Second Circuit decided Carol 
Barnhart Inc. v. Economy Cover Corp.92 The plaintiff in Barnhart 
alleged copyright infringement of four human torso display forms.93 
As in Kieselstein, the defendant admitted to copying the plaintiff's 
works, but denied liability on the grounds that the mannequins 
were utilitarian articles that did not possess separable artistic ele­
ments which could be subject to copyright.94 The Second Circuit 
agreed, and denied copyright protection because the mannequins 
could not satisfy the separability test.95 
Moreover, as in Kieselstein, the court paid small deference to 
the question of usefulness. The court accepted without argument 
that the plaintiff's works were useful articles as defined in the 1976 
Act.96 Noting that the mannequins' function is to display clothes, 
89. Id. 
90. Id. at 994 (Weinstein, J., dissenting). 
91. Id. at 996 (Weinstein, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
92. 773 F.2d 411 (2d Cir. 1985). 
93. See id. at 413. 
94. See id. 
95. See id. at 418-19. 
96. See id. at 414-15 ("[s]ince the [mannequins] are concededly useful articles, the 
crucial issue in determining their copyrightability is" the question of physical or concep­
tual separability). 
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the court found no protect able aesthetic or artistic qualities separa­
ble from the utilitarian aspects of the articles under the separability 
test.97 Indeed, Judge Newman's dissent emphasized the indisputa­
ble nature of the mannequins' usefulness: "each has the 'intrinsic 
utilitarian function' of serving as a means of displaying clothing and 
accessories to customers of retail stores. "98 
The utilitarian function of these articles obviously extends be­
yond merely portraying the mannequins' appearance. However, 
the court did not discuss why or explain how the function of dis­
playing or modeling clothing qualifies as an intrinsic utilitarian 
function. Barnhart is a good example of accepting any use-aside 
from portraying appearance or conveying information-as an in­
trinsic utilitarian function. 
Two years later, in Brandir International, Inc. v. Cascade Pa­
cific Lumber Co. ,99 the Second Circuit was presented with another 
opportunity to examine the definitional scope of intrinsic utilitarian 
functions. At issue in Brandir was the copyright ability of bicycle 
racks. loo These racks were formed from continuous undulating 
pieces of steam pipe bent into form "to permit parking under as 
well as over the rack's curves .... Its undulating shape is said ... to 
permit double the storage of conventional bicycle racks. "101 The 
court held that the bicycle racks, as useful articles, did not satisfy 
the separability test and were therefore not subject to copyright.102 
Adopting a standard suggested by Professor Denicola,I03 the 
court approached the question of copyrightability by examining 
"'the relationship between the proffered work and the process of 
industrial design."'l04 The court noted "that 'the dominant charac­
teristic of industrial design is the influence of nonaesthetic, utilita­
rian concerns'" and concluded "that copyrightability 'ultimately 
depend[s] on the extent to which the work reflects artistic expres­
sion uninhibited by functional considerations. "'105 In other words, 
"if design elements reflect a merger of aesthetic and functional con­
siderations, the artistic aspects of a work cannot be said to be con­
97. See id. at 418. 
98. [d. at 420 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
99. 834 F.2d 1142 (2d Cir. 1987). 
100. See id. at 1143. 
101. [d. at 1146-47. 
102. See id. at 1148. 
103. See generally Denicola, supra note 6, at 741-42. 
104. Brandir, 834 F.2d at 1145 (quoting Denicola, supra note 6, at 741). 
105. [d. (quoting Denicola, supra note 6, at 741). 
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ceptually separable from the utilitarian elements."106 The court 
approached the problem of copyright ability from a design oriented 
perspective, "derogating protection on grounds of functional con­
siderations."lo7 Hence, the court recognized the significant role 
utilitarian functions play in the analysis of determining the scope of 
copyright protection. 
The court proceeded to examine the manufacturing history be­
hind the development of the bicycle racks.108 The court observed 
that the original design of the racks stemmed from wire sculptures 
formed from continuous undulating pieces of wire. lo9 The sculp­
tures were created and displayed "as a means of personal expres­
sion, but apparently were never sold [as works ofart]."110 Their 
utilitarian function was not discovered until a bicycle enthusiast 
suggested .to the designer that the sculptures could serve as excel­
lent bike racks, "permitting bicycles to be parked under the 
overloops as well as on top of the underloops."111 The designer 
then met with Brandir several times before negotiating a deal to 
manufactu.re the design as Brandir RIBBON Racks.112 
Brandir spent some $100,000 on advertising and promotional 
literature, targeting architectural and landscaping magazines.113 
RIBBON Racks were featured in Popular Science, Art and Archi­
tecture, and Design 384 magazines.1l4 The design won an Industrial 
Designers Society, of America award in the spring of 1980.115 More­
over, sales of RIBBON Racks exceeded $1.3 million, ranging in 
price from $395 to $2,025 for stainless steel I;I1odels.116 
, . , . 
The court held that the bicycle racks were not copyrightable 
because they did not' s~tisfy the separability test.1l7 In support of its 
holding, the court noted, that the design was influenced in signifi­
cant measures by utiljtarian concerns.118 The court stated that 
[i]n creating the RIBBON Rack, the designer has clearly adapted 
106. Id. 
107. LoBello, supra note 64, at 124. 
108. See Brandir, 834 F.2d at 1146. 
109. See id. 
110. Id. 
111. Id. 
112. See id. 
113. See id. 
114. See id. 
115. See id. 
116. See id. 
117. See id. at 1148. 
118. See id. at 1147. 
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the original aesthetic elements to accommodate and further a 
utilitarian purpose. These altered design features of the RIB­
BON Rack, including the spacesaving, open design achieved by 
widening the upper loops to permit parking under as well as over 
the rack's curves, the straightened vertical elements that allow in­
and above-ground installation of the rack, the ability to fit all 
types of bicycles and mopeds, and the heavy-gauged tubular con­
struction of rustproof galvanized steel, are all features that com­
bine to make for a safe, secure, and maintenance-free system of 
parking bicycles and mopeds.119 
The court found that "form and function were inextricably inter­
twined, ... [t]he design being as much the result of utilitarian pres­
sures as aesthetic choices. Indeed, the visually pleasing proportions 
and symmetricality of the rack represent design changes made in 
response to functional concems."120 Unable to separate artistic ele­
ments physically or conceptually from utilitarian aspects, the court 
denied copyright protection.121 
The court's analysis of how useful articles develop from origi­
nal works of art suggests an approach in determining whether a par­
ticular use constitutes an intrinsic utilitarian function of an article 
seeking copyright protection. Factors the court examined in deter­
mining the usefulness of the racks included: how much the bicycle 
racks differed in design from the sculptural wire-work, the utilita­
rian reasons behind such design changes, manufacturing considera­
tions and materials, advertising costs, how the rack was promoted, 
and sales.122 These factors tend to establish the degree of an arti­
cle's functionality in relation to its artistic elements. Hence, under 
Brandir, it is possible to draw distinctions between mere utilitarian 
functions and intrinsic utilitarian functions because the Second Cir­
cuit, as well as Professor Denicola, recognize that functionality ex­
ists in various states of degrees.123 
Gay Toys, Inc. v. Buddy L Corp.124 further demonstrates that 
simply because articles have uses that go beyond portraying appear­
ances or conveying information does not mean that such uses are 
intrinsic utilitarian functions of these articles.125 The Sixth Circuit 
in Gay Toys recognized that there is a definitional difference be­
119. Id. 
120. Id. 
121. See id. at 1148. 
122. See id. at 1146-47. 
123. See id. at 1145-48; Denicola, supra note 6, at 741-47. 
124. 703 F.2d 970 (6th Cir. 1983). 
125. See id. at 973. 
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tween utilitarian functions and intrinsic utilitarian functions. The 
issue raised on appeal in Gay Toys was whether toys, in this case, 
model airplanes, were copyrightable subject matter under the 1976 
Act.126 The district court had asked whether the toy planes pos­
sessed any utility, and concluded that "[t]oys are useful."127 "A 
plane," the court reasoned, "is a thing to play with. Play is an inte­
gral part of growing up. Children need toys. A toy airplane is use­
ful and possesses utilitarian and functional characteristics in that it 
permits a child to dream and to let his or her imagination soar."128 
Finding that toys met the definitional requirements of section 101 
of the 1976 Act, the district court held that toys are useful articles 
and not copyrightable.129 
The Sixth Circuit began its discussion by reviewing the legisla­
tive history of the 1976 Act.130 The court stated that 
it might be argued that certain changes made by the 1976 Act 
broaden the "useful article" exception. The exception that devel­
oped under the 1909 Act disallowed copyright protection to arti­
cles whose sole intrinsic function was utility. On the other hand, 
the 1976 Act disallows copyright protection to articles which 
have an intrinsic utilitarian function.131 
The court, however, read Congress' intent to exclude from copy­
right protection industrial products such as automobiles, food 
processors, and television sets.132 The court said that toys function 
more like paintings in that they are to be looked at and enjoyed.B3 
"The function of toys is much more similar to that of works of art 
than it is to the 'intrinsic utilitarian function' of industrial prod­
uctS."134 Acknowledging that toys are meant to be played with, a 
use beyond merely portraying appearance or conveying informa­
tion, the court declared that not all uses beyond portraying appear­
126. See id. at 971. 
127. See Gay Toys, Inc. v. Buddy L Corp., 522 F. Supp. 622, 625 (E.D. Mich. 
1981), rev'd, 703 F.2d 970 (6th Cir. 1983). 
128. Id. 
129. See id. at 626-27. 
130. See Gay Toys, 703 F.2d at 973. See also supra Part I.B.1 for a discussion of 
the 1976 Act's legislative history. 
131. Gay Toys, 703 F.2d at 973-74 (citing Melville B. Nimmer, The Subject Matter 
of Copyright Under the Act of1976,24 UCLA L. REv. 978, 1001-03 (1977». See supra 
note 68 and accompanying text for a discussion on this point. 
132. See Gay Toys, 703 F.2d at 973 (citing H.R. REp. No. 94-1476, at 55 (1976), 
reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5668). 
133. See id. 
134. Id. 
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ances are intrinsic utilitarian functions. Hence, toys are not useful 
articles because they "do not even have an intrinsic function other 
than the portrayal of the real item" as a matter of law; rather, they 
are copyrightable pictorial, graphic, or sculptural workS.135 
A year after Gay Toys, the Ninth Circuit decided Poe v. Miss­
ing Persons .136 The court in Poe had to decide whether a bathing 
suit served as a utilitarian article of clothing or as a copyrightable 
sculptural work.137 Titled "Aquatint No.5," Gregory Poe described 
his swimsuit "as an eccentric and controversial" piece of art and not 
clothing.138 Poe sued for copyright infringement because defend­
ants had published a photograph of the swimsuit on an album cover 
without Poe's permission.139 The defendants conceded that Poe 
designed the article, but that as a swimsuit, it was an uncopyright­
able useful article.140 Poe appealed the district court's granting of 
the defendants' motion for summary judgment on the grounds that 
there existed a disputed issue of material fact as to whether "Aqua­
tint No.5" was a utilitarian article of clothing or a copyrightable 
work of art.141 
On appeal, the defendants cited Gay Toys, Inc. v. Buddy L 
Corp.142 to support their position that usefulness is a question of 
law and not fact.143 The court, however, distinguished Gay Toys 
from the present case by observing that "[n]o factual issue was 
presented as to whether the copied articles were toys. The Sixth 
Circuit held in Gay Toys that toy airplanes are protectible because 
they have no intrinsic utilitarian function other than to portray real 
airplanes."144 The issue before the Ninth Circuit was whether Poe 
designed a functional swimsuit or a copyrightable pictorial, graphic, 
or sculptural work.145 
The court noted that Poe's swimsuit could potentially be used 
as an article of clothing based on evidence showing that it was worn 
135. Id. at 974 (holding that toys do not have intrinsic functions other than to 
portray their own appearances). 
136. 745 F.2d 1238 (9th Cir. 1984). 
137. See id. at 1239, 1241. 
138. Id. at 1240. 
139. See id. at 1239. 
140. See id. 
141. See id. 
142. 703 F.2d 970 (6th Cir. 1983). See also supra notes 124-35 and accompanying 
text for a discussion on Gay Toys. 
143. See Poe, 745 F.2d at 1242. 
144. Id. at 1242-43. 
145. See id. at 1243. 
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for modeling purposes.146 However, the court did not decide 
whether Poe "created an article of clothing which can function as a 
swimsuit."147 In other words, the court recognized that Poe's swim­
suit might possess a "use" beyond portraying its own appearance; 
but the court did not decide whether such use constituted an intrin­
sic utilitarian function beyond merely portraying appearance. In­
stead, the court remanded the case for trial in order to determine 
whether Aquatint No. 5 possessed an intrinsic utilitarian function 
beyond portraying appearance so as to be considered a useful arti­
cle properly subject to the separability test.148 
The Ninth Circuit identified four factors relevant to the ques­
tion of usefulness: 
(1) expert evidence may be offered concerning the usefulness of 
the article and whether any apparent functional aspects can be 
separated from the artistic aspects; (2) evidence of Poe's intent in 
designing the article may be relevant in determining whether it 
has a utilitarian function; (3) testimony concerning the custom 
and usage within the art world and the clothing trade concerning 
such objects also may be relevant; and (4) the district court may 
also consider the admissibility of evidence as to Aquatint No. 5's 
marketability as a work of art.149 
As in the Brandir case, these factors focus on the degree of func­
tionality in relation to artistic elements. Moreover, Poe illustrates 
the significance of determining whether particular uses of articles, 
perhaps utilitarian in nature, are intrinsic utilitarian functions of the 
articles. This question is not decided as a matter of law; rather, it is 
more appropriately decided as a question of fact. 
In deciding whether animal mannequins constituted useful arti­
146. 'see id. at 1241. 
147. Id. at 1242. 
148. See id. at 1242-43. 
149. Id. at 1243 (citing Norris Indus., Inc. v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 696 
F.2d 918, 922 (11th Cir. 1983) ("useful" articles are those "designed primarily to serve a 
utilitarian function"); May v. Morganelli-Heumann & Assocs., 618 F.2d 1363, 1368 (9th 
Cir. 1980) (genuine dispute as to custom and usage within architectural profession pre­
cludes summary judgment); Saxony Prods. v. Guerlain, Inc., 513 F.2d 716 (9th Cir. 
1975) (district court erred in granting summary judgment after conducting a perfume 
"sniff test"); Trans-World Mfg. v. AI Nyman & Sons, Inc., 95 F.R.D. 95, 99 (D. Del. 
1982) (refusing summary judgment on copyrightability of eyeglass display case, and that 
stating "such a conclusion should be made by the trier of fact on the basis of expert 
testimony rather than as a matter of law by this Court"); 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER, 
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.08[B] (1984) (suggesting that courts might look to see if an 
article with no utilitarian use would still be marketable to some significant segment of 
the community simply because of its aesthetic qualities» (footnote omitted). 
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cles, the Fourth Circuit recently had an opportunity to address this 
issue as a question of fact in Superior Form Builders, Inc. v. Dan 
Chase Taxidermy Supply CO.150 In that case, the defendant argued 
that the plaintiff's mannequins were not copyrightable sculptural 
works because they possessed "the utilitarian function of acting as 
mounts for animal skins for display."151 In determining the useful­
ness of plaintiff's mannequins, however, the court noted that the 
defendant's argument overlooked the distinction between manne­
quins and plastic foam pellet stuffing used in taxidermy.152 
A mannequin provides the creative form and expression of the 
ultimate animal display, whereas pellets do not. Even though 
covered with a skin, the mannequin is not invisible but conspicu­
ous in the final display. The angle of the animal's head, the juxta­
position of its body parts, and the shape of the body parts in the 
final display is little more than the portrayal of the underlying 
mannequin. . . . Thus, any utilitarian aspect of the mannequin 
exists "merely to portray the appearance" of the animaP53 
The court emphasized that the author's portrayal of the animal 
form exists in the final product.154 "It is the portrayal of the 
animal's body expression given by the mannequin that is thus pro­
tectable under the Copyright ACt."155 The court found that the 
mannequins' usefulness subsisted in their portrayal of the appear­
ance of animals.156 The Fourth Circuit effectively held that the 
mannequins' use of acting as mounts for animal skins for display 
was insufficient to qualify as an intrinsic utilitarian function. 
Although the animal mannequins possessed a utilitarian function 
beyond merely portraying appearance, i.e., to act as mounts, the 
court found that the mannequins' primary function was to portray 
animal expressions and that this function outweighed their utilita­
rian function to act as aIiimal skin mounts. 
In sum, courts have generally considered articles possessing 
uses beyond portraying appearance or conveying information as in­
trinsic utilitarian functions making such articles useful articles as 
150. 74 F.3d 488 (4th Cir. 1996). 
151. [d. at 493. 
152. See id. at 493-94. 
153. [d. (quoting 17 u.s.c. § 101 (1994)). 
154. See id. 
155. [d. (citing Masquerade Novelty, Inc. v. Unique Indus., Inc., 912 F.2d 663 (3d 
Cir. 1990); Rachel v. Banana Republic, Inc., 831 F.2d 1503, 1507 (9th Cir. 1987); Kamar 
Int'l, Inc. v. Russ Berrie and Co., 657 F.2d 1059, 1061 (9th Cir. 1981)). 
156. See id. at 494. 
164 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20:143 
defined by the 1976 Act.157 Indeed, these courts seemed more than 
anxious to assume usefulness158 so as to grapple with the concept of 
separability. On the other hand, some courts recognize that simply 
because certain articles possess utilitarian functions does not mean 
such functions are intrinsic to those articles.159 The challenge, then, 
is to strike a balance between these extremes to determine what 
constitute intrinsic utilitarian functions. 
One approach to this inquiry is "to err" in favor of over-pro­
tection.160 Unfortunately, broadening the scope of protection, 
when unnecessary, undermines the goals of copyright protection 
because it comes at the expense of public welfare.161 Gay Toys is a 
good example of over-protection. Gay Toys could be broadly read 
to suggest that toys are copyrightable pictorial, graphic, or sculp­
tural works as a matter of law because they do not possess an intrin­
sic utilitarian function other than to portray appearance.162 Poe 
suggests, however, that determining whether something should 
properly be defined as useful is not a question of law; rather, it is a 
question of fact.163 The question remains, however, as to how in­
trinsic utilitarian functions are defined. 
Moreover, neither the 1976 Act nor its legislative history pro­
vide any instructions to determine whether particular uses qualify 
as intrinsic utilitarian functions. The judiciary has also been unsuc­
cessful in establishing guidelines to determine whether articles pos­
sessing utilitarian functions constitute intrinsic utilitarian functions. 
Hence, this paper suggests the following analysis to determine the 
definitional scope of intrinsic utilitarian functions in relation to arti­
cles seeking copyright protection. 
II. ANALYSIS 
Distinguishing art from useful articles is inevitably subjective 
157. See supra note 66 and cases cited therein. 
158. In other words, courts have seemed more than anxious to assume that most 
articles possess an intrinsic utilitarian function beyond portraying appearance or con­
veying information so that they may address the issue of separability. 
159. See, e.g., Superior Form, 74 F.3d at 493 (finding mannequin use as animal 
skin mount insufficient to qualify as intrinsic utilitarian function); Poe v. Missing Per­
sons, 745 F.2d 1238, 1241-42 (9th Cir. 1984); Gay Toys, Inc. v. Buddy L Corp., 703 F.2d 
970, 973-74 (6th Cir. 1983). 
160. See, e.g., Raskin, supra note 6, at 209-10. 
161. See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text. 
162. See Gay Toys, 703 F.2d at 974 ("[T]oys do not even have an intrinsic function 
other than the portrayal of the real item."). 
163. See Poe, 745 F.2d at 1242-43. 
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and arbitrary.l64 Congress has evidenced, however, its concern that 
granting copyright protection to useful articles would stifle progress 
in the arts and sciences.165 Copyright protection grants copyright 
owners exclusive rights,166 and protecting functional aspects of use­
ful articles would effectively deliver a monopoly to the owners over 
their respective articles. This would have a chilling effect on others 
to create and contribute to the arts and sciences.167 This result is 
contrary to the ultimate goals of copyright legislation in that the 
purpose of copyright is to promote art and science for public wel­
fare.168 Protecting the rights of authors is seen as a necessary 
means for such promotion.169 "Without assurance of protection, 
many authors would be discouraged from creative activity, and pro­
gress would lag."170 Authors are encouraged to create for the pub­
lic benefit because they are assured of receiving the fruits of their 
labors by granting them exclusive rights in their works for a limited 
term.171 
The challenge is striking a balance between granting enough 
protection to encourage creation and too much protection which 
discourages, indeed, may prohibit others from pursuing their own 
efforts in a similar field. l72 "The law concerning the protection of 
useful articles has shown just how difficult this balancing can be­
come, especially when commercial products are involved and much 
of the economy depends on competition within commercial 
fields."173 Therefore, before determining the appropriate scope of 
copyright protection, the first step in balancing the interests be­
tween public progress and authors' rights is to define whether the 
164. See, e.g., Raskin, supra note 6, at 195. 
165. See H.R. REp. No. 94-1476, at 54-55 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
5659, 5667-69; see also Carol Barnhart, Inc. v. Economy Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411 (2d 
Cir. 1985); Raskin, supra note 6, at 195. 
166. 17 U.S.c. § 106 (1994). 
167. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954); 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER, NIM· 
MER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.03[A) (1994); Raskin, supra note 6, at 195. 
168. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (Congress has the power to "promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and In­
ventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries ... "). 
169. See Mazer, 347 U.S. at 219; NIMMER, supra note 167, § 1.03[A); Raskin, 
supra note 6, at 195-96. 
170. Raskin, supra note 6, at 196; see also Mazer, 347 U.S. at 219; NIMMER, supra 
note 167, § 1.03[A). 
171. See Mazer, 347 U.S. at 219; REpORT ON THE GENERAL REVISION, supra note 
15, at 3-6; NIMMER, supra note 167, § 1.03[A). 
172. See Raskin, supra note 6, at 196. 
173. Raskin, supra note 6, at 196 (footnote omitted). 
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article seeking protection is a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work 
or a useful article under the 1976 Act. 
For example, the Sixth Circuit approached this question by 
weighing the usefulness of toy airplanes against their aesthetic ap­
peal in Gay Toys. The court recognized that "a toy airplane is to be 
played with and enjoyed, but a painting of an airplane, which is 
copyrightable, is to be looked at and enjoyed."174 Observing that 
"[t]he intention of Congress was to exclude from copyright protec­
tion industrial products such as automobiles, food processors, and 
television sets,"175 the court analogized "[t]he function of toys ... to 
that of works of art" because "toys do not even have an intrinsic 
function other than the portrayal of the real item. "176 
The holding in Gay Toys, however, could be read overly inclu­
sive as granting too much protection by categorizing all toys as 
proper subject matter warranting copyright protection. Under the 
Sixth Circuit's analysis, one is hard pressed to find any toy that 
might qualify as a useful article, because the court held as a matter 
of law that the only intrinsic function of toys is to portray appear­
ance.177 Basing copyright protection as to an entire class of articles 
is inconsistent with the basic premises of copyright protection.178 
Such a ruling undermines the purpose of copyright law because it 
comes at the expense of promoting the public interest.179 
Drawing an analytical starting point before addressing the ap­
propriate scope of an article's copyright protection is analogous to 
Judge Oakes' analysis concerning conceptual separability in Kiesel­
174. GayToys, 703 F.2d at 973.. 
175. Id. (emphasis added). 
176. Id. at 973-74. 
177. See id. Moreover, in a 1910 regulation defining "works of art" under the 
1909 Act, the Copyright Office declared that "[n]o copyright exists in toys, games, [or] 
dolls." COPYRIGHT OFFICE RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR THE REGISTRATION OF 
CLAIMS TO COPYRIGHT, BULL. No. 15, § 12(g) (1910); see also Denicola, supra note 6, 
at 710 n.20 . 
. 178. Cf. Note, supra note 21, at 1525. "[A]ny attempt to base copyright on a 
generalization as to an entire functional class seems inconsistent with the growing rec­
ognition that even the most narrowly utilitarian objects, if imaginatively designed, can 
be a source of aesthetic pleasure." Id. Indeed, there may exist toys whose "sole intrin­
sic function" is that of utility. For example, the KOOSH ball in OddzOn Products, Inc. 
v. Oman, 924 F.2d 346, 346 (D.C. Cir. 1991), was found to have been developed "to 
teach youngsters with poor eye-to-hand coordination how to play catch." Id. at 347. 
Though not raised on appeal, the court raised the question as to how the toy might be 
properly defined, i.e., as a useful article or as a copyrightable sculptural work. See id. at 
350. 
179. See supra notes 15-17, 165-71 and accompanying text. 
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stein-Cord.180 In addressing this question, Judge Oakes suggested 
that if aesthetic features are "primary," then conceptual separabil­
ity exists.181 Similarly, shifting this inquiry to usefulness and deter­
mining that aesthetic qualities are primary,182 may weigh against 
finding the article seeking copyright protection to be useful. In 
short, under a "primary functional significance" analysis, if an arti­
cle's primary functionality is aesthetic rather than utilitarian, then 
the article should properly be defined as a: pictorial, graphic, or 
sculptural work warranting copyright protection.183 Conversely, if 
an article's utilitarian considerations outweigh its aesthetic quali­
ties, the article should be defined under the 1976 Act as an unpro­
tectable useful article. 
The analysis begins by examining the specific article seeking 
copyright protection in order to define the article as a pictorial, 
graphic, or sculptural work or a us~ful article. The Copyright Of­
fice or courts should first consider potential functions of the article, 
i.e., whether uses of the article include aesthetic or utilitarian func­
tions or both. For example, the district court in Gay Toys held that 
a utilitarian function of toy airplanes was to allow children to play, 
dream, and let their imaginations soar.184 Another example is the 
argument in Superior Form that animal mannequins, similar to the 
human mannequins in Carol Barnhari?85 function as mounts for 
animal skins for display.186 These uses extend beyond the defini­
tion of "merely to portray the appearance of the article."187 
The next step is ascertaining whether the article seeking copy­
right protection is "in fact" a useful article, i.e., the question be­
comes whether the "use" in question qualifies as an intrinsic 
utilitarian function beyond portraying appearance or conveying in­
formation.188 This is accomplished by weighing the significance of 
180. See Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989, 993 (2d Cir. 
1980). 
181. Id. 
182. See Raskin, supra note 6, at 208. 
183. Note, however, that "fj]udges will then have to determine either through the 
ordinary observer or the designer's intent, which quality was primary and which was 
secondary." Raskin, supra note 6, at 208 n.274. 
184. See Gay Toys, Inc. v. Buddy L Corp., 522 F. Supp. 622, 625 (E.D. Mich. 
1981), rev'd, 703 F.2d 970 (6th Cir .. 1983). 
185. Carol Barnhart, Inc. v. Economy Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411 (2d Cir. 1985). 
186. See Superior Form Builders, Inc. v. Dan Chase Taxidermy Supply Co., 74 
F.3d 488, 493 (4th Cir. 1996). 
187. 17 U.S.c. § 101 (1994). 
188. As noted, most courts until recently Considered any use beyond portraying 
appearance or conveying information as an intrinsic utilitarian function. Superior 
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an article's "artistic or aesthetic" functionality against its "intrinsic 
utilitarian" functionality. Balancing an article's various "uses" 
against each other helps identify the degree of the article's utilita­
rian use because it measures the relative weight and importance of 
aesthetic functionality versus utilitarian functionality. The difficulty 
is deciding at which point any particular use becomes "an intrinsic 
utilitarian function" under the 1976 Act.189 
Apportioning the relative weight of aesthetic functionality and 
utilitarian functionality necessarily occurs on an ad hoc basis.190 
Although a case-by-case analysis maintains a subjective fiavor,l9l 
the Copyright Office and courts could rely on concrete factors al­
ready examined in previous cases to help determine whether spe­
cific items seeking copyright protection qualify as pictorial, graphic, 
or sculptural works or useful articles.192 These factors, albeit not 
dispositive, tend to establish the degree of an article's utilitarian 
function in relation to its aesthetic appeal. 
For example, in addressing the issue of separability, the court 
in Brandir considered the similarities and differences between the 
design of the article seeking protection from other articles having 
the same or similar use.193 It considered the reasons behind these 
Form, Gay Toys, and Poe stand for the proposition that this principle is not necessarily 
true, i.e., simply because an article possesses an additional utilitarian function beyond 
portraying appearance does not mean that such use should be considered an intrinsic 
utilitarian function. See supra note 66 and cases cited therein. 
This paper's suggested approach to the issue of defining an article seeking copy­
right protection considers both notions. It recognizes that neither the 1976 Act, its leg­
islative history, nor case law have ever precisely defined "intrinsic utilitarian function" 
as this term is used in its statutory context, see supra Part I.B, while at the same time 
qualifying the definitional scope of "intrinsic utilitarian function" to exclude any use 
beyond portraying appearance or conveying information and only including an article's 
use that is primarily and significantly utilitarian rather than aesthetic in nature. This is 
accomplished by weighing an article's aesthetic and utilitarian functions against each 
other. An article's appropriate definition turns on whether aesthetic or utilitarian con­
siderations outweigh the other. Hence, in keeping with Superior Form, Gay Toys, and 
Poe, an article can possess both aesthetic and utilitarian functions and receive copyright 
protection under the 1976 Act because it is properly defined as a pictorial, graphic, or 
sculptural work even though the article possesses an additional use beyond merely por­
traying appearance or conveying information. 
189. See supra note 188. 
190. See Raskin, supra note 6, at 209. 
191. See id. Compare Justice Holmes' famous copyright caveat: "It would be a 
dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to constitute themselves final 
judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of the narrowest and most obvious 
limits." Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903). 
192. See supra Part I.B.2. 
193. See Brandir Int'!, Inc. v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142, 1146-47 
(2d Cir. 1987). 
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design changes also relevant.194 The court examined the overall 
cost of manufacturing the article compared to its functional costs 
alone.195 It looked to consumer response and use of the article, 
manufacturing considerations, and the type of materials used for 
the article.196 These factors reflect whether the article's design was 
significantly influenced by utilitarian considerations.197 
The court in Brandir held that the bicycle racks seeking protec­
tion went through a transformation from an originally copyright­
able sculptural work to unprotectable useful articles because the 
utilitarian considerations in producing the racks outweighed their 
aesthetic considerations.198 The original design was changed to ac­
commodate bicycle storage.199 The type of material used in the 
original sculpture was changed to galvanized steel to survive in­
clement weather.2°O The court noted that consumers saw bicycle 
racks rather than sculptural artwork.201 The court determined that 
the use which extended beyond merely portraying appearance, i.e., 
the use as a bicycle storage rail, was sufficient enough to be defined 
as an intrinsic utilitarian function. Hence, the bicycle racks, which 
were seeking copyright protection, were defined as useful articles 
subject to the separability test because their utilitarian functionality 
outweighed any aesthetic considerations. 
Similarly, the court's challenge in Poe was determining 
whether Poe designed a "functional swimsuit or a work of art" 
before ascertaining the appropriate scope of copyright protec­
tion.202 Noting that "[t]he evidence presented by both sides at the 
hearing on the motion for a summary judgment shows that Poe was 
attempting to create a work of art which portrayed an article of 
clothing,"203 the court concluded that a genuine issue of material 
fact existed because it was unclear to what extent Poe's "swimsuit" 
could be "used" as such, i.e., whether Poe's swimsuit was by defini­
tion a useful article under the 1976 Act. Remanding the case for 
trial, the court established four factors relevant to the question of 
usefulness. 
194. See id. 
195. See id. 
196. See id. 
197. See id. 
198. See id. 
199. See id. 
200. See id. 
201. See id. at 1147. 
202. Poe v. Missing Persons, 745 F.2d 1238, 1243 (9th Cir. 1984). 
203. [d. at 1242. 
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First, the Ninth Circuit said that expert evidence is relevant in 
determining whether an article possesses an intrinsic utilitarian 
function.204 Second, in subscribing to Professor Denicola's ap­
proach, the court said that evidence of the author's intent in design­
ing the article may indicate the degree of its utilitarian functions,z05 
Third, evidence of custom and usage concerning the article in ques­
tion within the art world may be relevant.206 Finally, evidence con­
cerning the article's marketability as a work of art should be 
considered.207 
Under a "primary functional significance" analysis, the Fourth 
Circuit in Superior Form, for example, could have weighed the use­
fulness of the animal mannequins against their aesthetic appeal by 
considering the above enumerated factors in Brandir and Poe. The 
Fourth Circuit emphasized the mannequins' importance in portray­
ing the ultimate expressive aspects of the final product.208 "Even 
though covered with a skin, the mannequin is not invisible but con­
spicuous in the final display."209 In determining whether this qual­
ity was principally influenced by aesthetic or utilitarian 
considerations, the court could have examined the similarities and 
differences between the design of the animal mannequins and other 
manneqUIns. 
The court was quick to point out, for example, that the human 
mannequins in Carol Barnhart, which were held to be uncopyright­
able useful articles, were primarily "used to display clothes for com­
mercial sale . . . and were not designed for portraying 
themselves."210 The Fourth Circuit concluded that the Second Cir­
cuit did not find that the author in Carol Barnhart "fixed a mode of 
expression in a tangible form for the purpose of displaying or por­
traying the article," i.e., the primary function was not aesthetic; 
rather, it was utilitarian.211 
Conversely, the court in Superior Form found that the animal 
mannequins were "intended to give body expression to the final dis­
plays and to constitute a permanent portrayal of the animal."212 In 
204. See id. at 1243. 
205. See id. 
206. See id. 
207. See id. 
208. See Superior Form Builders, Inc. v. Dan Chase Taxidermy Supply Co., 74 
F.3d 488, 493-94 (4th Cir. 1996). 
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support of this contention, the court could have relied on evidence 
of the author's intent to create a copyrightable sculptural work, evi­
dence concerning the animal mannequins' marketability as sculp­
tural works to show aesthetic significance, and evidence of 
consumer response, i.e., whether consumers purchased the animal 
mannequins primarily for aesthetic reasons. These factors indicate 
whether the mannequins' designs were significantly influenced by 
artistic considerations and whether the mannequins' principal func­
tion was primarily aesthetic.213 
Though the mannequins served a utilitarian function as mounts 
for animal skin displays; the court concluded that the principal utili­
tarian aspect was to "portray the appearance" of the animal.214 The 
usefulness of the animal mannequins as mounts did not outweigh 
their aesthetic features and qualities. Hence, the animal manne­
quins were defined as sculptural works properly warranting copy­
right protection. 
The above factors are germane considerations in determining 
the significance of an article's aesthetic. or utilitarian qualities. 
These factors tend to establish whether an article's' particular use 
stems principally from utilitarian considerations rather than aes­
thetic appeal and whether form and function are inextricably inter­
twined.215 These factors also help explain the degree of an article's 
utilitarian use because they identify the relative weight of aesthetic 
functionality versus utilitarian functionality. IIi short, the difficulty 
of deciding at which point "use" becomes "an intrinsic utilitarian 
function" under a "primary functional significance" anaiysis is more 
clearly focused when examined as a question of fact on an ad hoc 
basis after considering the factors discussed in both Brandir and 
Poe. 
CONCLUSION 
Under the 1976 Copyright Act, "pictorial, graphic, and sculp­
tural" works are proper subject matter warranting copyright protec­
213. ct. Brandir Int'l, Inc. v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co, 834F.2d 1142, 1147 (2d 
Cir. 1987). The Second Circuit found that form and function were inextricably inter­
twined, the design of the bicycle racks at issue "being as much the result of utilitarian 
pressures as aesthetic choices .... [D]esign changes [were] made in response to func­
tional concerns." [d. at 1147. Hence, utilitarian considerations outweighed aesthetic 
functionality to define the bicycle racks as useful articles. . 
214. [d. 
215. See id. at 1147 (stating that when form and function are inextricably inter­
twined, separability does not exist). 
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tion. The exception to this rule is that the designs of useful articles 
are not copyrightable except to the extent that pictorial, graphic, or 
sculptural design features may physically or conceptually exist sepa­
rately from the articie. Useful articles are defined as having an in­
trinsic utilitarian function beyond portraying appearance or 
conveying information. So long as articles possess "an intrinsic util­
itarian function," they are defined as useful and their designs are 
not copyrightable unless particular elements of their designs satisfy 
the separability test. Unfortunately, the 1976 Act and its legislative 
history do not provide instructions to determine what constitute in­
trinsic utilitarian functions. Moreover, the judiciary has been un­
successful in establishing guidelines on how to answer this question. 
Because the purpose of copyright law is to promote the arts 
and sciences for public benefit, the appropriate scope of copyright 
protection turns on defining the specific article seeking protection 
and not on a general categorization of the article. Whether particu­
lar articles possess intrinsic utilitarian functions is a question of fact 
and not a question of law. Indeed, some articles presently afforded 
copyright protection may properly be defined as useful articles be­
cause they possess intrinsic utilitarian functions beyond portraying 
appearance. 
Determining whether a particular use qualifies as an intrinsic 
utilitarian function should be done on an ad hoc basis under a "pri­
mary functional significance" analysis by considering the relevant 
factors discussed in Brandir and Poe. This permits the Copyright 
Office and courts to weigh the interests of authors against public 
progress. Rather than favoring over-protection, as illustrated in 
Gay Toys, and holding that certain categories of articles, for exam­
ple, toys, do not possess intrinsic utilitarian functions beyond por­
traying appearance as a matter of law, a case-by-case analysis to 
determine "usefulness" protects the interests of authors, the public 
welfare, and establishes clearer guidelines to address future issues 
of this nature. 
